Politics, Poverty, and Rage: Misconceptions About Islamist Movements by Baylouny, Anne Marie
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2007
Politics, Poverty, and Rage:
Misconceptions About Islamist Movements
Baylouny, Anne Marie
þÿ ( " P o l i t i c s ,   P o v e r t y ,   a n d   R a g e :   M i s c o n c e p t i o n s   A b o u t   I s l a m i s t   M o v e m e n t s , "   A r c h e s   Q u a r t e r l y   1 ,
no. 1 (2007): 6-10.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/35587
6 A R C H E S  Q U A R T E R L Y VOLUME 1 •  EDITION 1 
Anne Marie Baylouny
In recent years violent movements in thename of Islam have been catapulted tocentre stage in U.S. foreign policy cir-
cles. Yet before concrete strategies can be
formulated to deal with this phenomenon,
the nature and dynamics of Islamist mobili-
sation itself must be understood.1 What
motivates an individual to join an Islamist
group and possibly engage in violent activi-
ties? Under what conditions will these
groups moderate their views, and when will
they radicalise? While our policy choices
dealing with the Muslim world and interna-
tional terrorism inevitably hinge on our
answers to these questions, a serious theory
has been lacking.2
Lessons extracted from contentious study
are used to provide insight into complex
political allegiances in the Muslim world
which are further contributing prescriptive
policy formulations to defuse Islamist move-
ments’ violent path. Social movement theory
in particular demonstrates local political
inclusion can stimulate moderation, stunt-




Analysis of the roots of Islamism have typi-
cally been based upon emotions, economic
desperation, or cultural rejection. By this
line of reasoning, poverty, hatred of Western
culture, or lack of hope spur group forma-
tion that aim, either through the creation of
an Islamic state or isolation from the global
community, to return the Muslim world to a
past state of glory. Some link Islamism to
poverty and deprivation while others includ-
ing Islamists themselves, reiterate Samuel
Huntington’s claim that the West is cultural-
ly opposed to the rest of the world. Under
these theories, policies to decrease
Islamism’s appeal would centre on either
economic growth or cultural separation; the
rest of the world should work to either
increase living standards in Muslim nations
or relax their pace of integration into the
international economy. Appealing as those
objectives may be to many, the data on
Islamism, and on oppositional movements
in general, indicate that the equation of eco-
nomic or cultural distress with Islamism is
misplaced, or at the very least incomplete. 
Psychological and economic explanations
situate Islamism as the result of an explo-
sion of pent-up grievances,3 the last resort of
a person “fed up” and gone crazy. While
such a description makes intuitive sense, the
theory does not fit reality. Varying economic
circumstances across regions and time peri-
ods do not match the occurrence of rebel-
lions and protest movements, as many
scholars have shown.4 In fact, economic
grievances abound throughout history, but
movements based on them have been rare.
When is a grievance bad enough to start a
movement? And why do starving popula-
tions often not rebel, while their well-off
neighbours do? Iran’s Islamist revolution
occurred in a context of economic plenty,
and an analysis of Muslim countries demon-
strates the lack of fit between this theory and
the actual history of Islamist actions.5
The social background of individual move-
ment members further demonstrates the fal-
lacy of such theories. Islamist activists are
neither economically deprived nor culturally
monochrome. They are neither loners nor
marginalised individuals searching for
meaning and belonging in modern society.
Rather Islamists background is from the
most technically advanced sectors of society,
often students or graduates of sciences and
social sciences. Islamist activists are well
rooted in their communities and have exten-
sive personal networks, parallel to national-
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The 9/11 terrorists – along with suicide
bombers in the Palestinian territories – are a
testament to this profile.7 A survey of
Hizbullah adherents found that despite its
rhetoric, the party was not in fact the repre-
sentative of the lower class rather the bulk of
its support came from the middle and upper
classes.8
Focusing on religion or religiosity to identify
Islamists is similarly misguided. Religious
involvements in political Islam are not
directly related since Islamists and their sup-
porters are not more religious than non-
Islamists. Similarly, the level of support for
Islamist movements diverges sharply from
the level of popular acceptance of their goals,
particularly the establishment of an Islamic
state. In Lebanon, the overwhelming major-
ity of Hizbullah adherents, along with most
Shi’ites in general, prefer a Western political
system (modelled on Switzerland or the
United States), not a theocratic one.
Discrepancies exist between the percentage
of people who voted for Hizbullah and those
who chose it as their favourite political party
with lower ratings for the latter, thus indicat-
ing the practice of strategic voting instead of
widespread belief in the movement itself.
Hizbullah members are not significantly
more religious than the adherents of secular
political parties. In fact, a significant num-
ber of the highly religious declared them-
selves opposed to the establishment of
Islamic political parties.9 Surveys in the West
Bank and Gaza found similar opinions.
Overall, less than three percent of
Palestinians in the territories desired an
Islamic state while almost 21% trusted
Hamas more than any other political fac-
tions.10 The group subsequently won the
Palestinian elections running on reform and
anti-corruption mandate.
Culture and economy are only indirectly
related to Islamist mobilisation for violent
and moderate groups alike.11 Grievances
alone do not create a movement as such; at
most they are but one element that organis-
ers can exploit to aid in organising. This
directly contradicts explanations of
Islamism based on economic opportunities
is the fact that substantial resources and net-
works are necessary for movements to
organise.12 Leaders generally have privileged
backgrounds, thus the substance of the
movement and its ability to mobilise mem-
bers are more important than the broad
statements about motivations picked up by
the Western press. What does it take to
attract an initial following and then organise
it into a network? 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND
ISLAMIST RESPONSES TO
DEMOCRATIC CARROTS 
Adversarial political theories, of which social
movement is the most prominent branch,
are well situated to address these issues.13
Social movement theory has long addressed
the questions of terrorism and violent con-
flict and through its lenses Islamism conun-
drum – so baffling from other perspectives –
becomes clear. Beyond the demonstrations
and letter-writing campaigns common to
democratic systems, contentious politics
span a wide horizon from riots to revolu-
tions to terrorism.14 Non-violent movements
more typically recognised as social move-
ments are included however these are rare
under authoritarian regimes. 
In spite of the claims of movement adher-
ents, the real motivating grievances of
Islamism are local issues like any other
social movements including the anti-globali-
sation campaign. The concerns that moti-
vate Islamists centre in their towns,
provinces, and local economies, however,
Islamist movements differ considerably
from each other having been moulded by the
states they oppose, the resources at their dis-
Islamist movements
differ considerably from
each other having been
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posal, Islamists networks, and local factors.
National movements have different goals
than international activists, and ally only
when their goals coincide. Even within the
same state, movements can have radically
opposed motivating agendas and in some
cases, compete and attempt to defeat rival
Islamist movements15 as witnessed in parts
of Iraq currently. Statements by group lead-
ers and Islamist charters should be viewed
in light of their actions in response to con-
crete changes and often, the “rhetoric of
rebellion” does not equate to the actual griev-
ance. Viewing entire movement practices
instead of simply their statements reveals an
alternative logic.16 Consider Hamas’ political
win, inconsistent yet clear changes in party
policy on Israel were voiced, including the
possibility of subjecting policy on Israel to a
public vote whose outcome the party agreed
to follow. Internally, Hamas debated and dis-
cussed its own positions on elections sub-
jecting them to an internal referendum.17
Acknowledging Islamism as a form of oppo-
sition politics means its trajectory is not ran-
dom, rather governed by political considera-
tions and strategic calculations. It can devel-
op into different forms of protest and organ-
isations, including civil society and social
welfare associations, given appropriate and
credible incentives. The relevant influences
for these movements are the array of politi-
cal opportunities they face. The key ques-
tions for policy makers are many and simply
put, what are the prevailing power relations?
How does the group want these relations to
change and what paths to mainstream polit-
ical inclusion are open or blocked? The third
question includes splits among elites that
movements can exploit, opportunities to par-
take in elections, and the character of repres-
sion by the state. 
Exclusion or inclusion from the political sys-
tem plays a powerful role in radicalising
movements. While fears of “one person, one
vote, one time” will remain, data indicates
when given the opportunity to participate in
politics at the price of moderation, move-
ments will alter their very nature to respond
to this stimulus. Hizbullah’s experience
demonstrates this dynamic. The group mod-
erated to enter general election by reframing
its central objective and foregoing its stated
goal of an Islamic state. Lebanon’s substan-
tial Christian population makes this a spe-
cial case to which Hizbullah must be sensi-
tive in order to avoid renewed conflict.18 The
party formed alliances with Christians and
supported Christian candidates in elections.
The incentives Hizbullah responded to
demonstrate the fundamental logic of the
movement, notwithstanding any rhetoric to
the contrary. In parliament, Hizbullah repre-
sentatives discussed not religion but eco-
nomic development.19 Hizbullah’s political
actions following the 2006 war with Israel
further demonstrate the political logic of
Islamist movements. Riding on a wave of
mass support after the Israeli bombard-
ment, Hizbullah utilised the democratic
tools of demonstrations and boycotts in a
fight to gain more power in government.
Unsuccessful, the movement dropped its
tone and offered a compromise. 
Democratic theory has long held that main-
stream political participation moderates
political parties. Movements are co-opted,
choosing to work within the limits of the sys-
tem. Not all will participate, however
increasingly Islamist political parties have
chosen the electoral path. They hope for
change through the political process rather
than risk a violent conflict. Furthermore,
once leaders or political parties have
obtained a vested interest in the system, they
will exert pressure upon the more radical
wings of their movements not to jeopardise
their established position. On the other hand
when the opposition party is illegal, no
incentive to moderate exists. 
To mobilise continuous support organisa-
tions must provide public demonstrations of
the movement’s endurance, a type of adver-
tisement or communication with the con-
stituency. Newsletters may work for
Greenpeace, but an illegal movement must
employ alternative means to advertise its
existence.20 Front page news serves as adver-
tisements for a movement’s effectiveness;
international news reaches international
adherents while local news suffices for
domestic movements. This is one way that
violence as a tactic glues a movement togeth-
er creating an identity and group solidarity.
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Absent viable participation in the political
realm, violence also serves the movement
function of communicating demands to
authorities.21 When groups are legal, demon-
strations can perform this vital role. 
Movements do not merely build upon pre-
existing identities or reflect group feelings
already in place. Social movements actively
fashion new identities mainly through fram-
ing techniques. Framing is the formulation
of ideological schemes akin to slogans that
sell the movement to a constituency. Frames
must resonate with the population by tap-
ping into existing symbols while at the same
time transforming their cultural meanings.
Problems are spun as unjust grievances for
which clear blame can be assessed and a
solution proposed by the movement.
Familiar symbols are used in novel ways,
much in the way that liberation theology
altered Christianity by reframing poverty,
once accepted as an act of God, now a social
issue of fundamental injustice. 
Religion plays a key role in Islamist move-
ments without focusing on doctrinal
specifics or religiosity of Islamists. The prac-
tice of Islam within Islamist movements has
been shown to be malleable by adopting
aspects of left-wing politics and nationalism
to deploying Leninist manoeuvres often
deemed antithetical to the religious doctrine
itself.22 Religious movements have distinct
advantages in authoritarian contexts given
the solidarity frame provided by, particularly
when other organisational elements are for-
bidden. 
State restriction on mobilisation not only
pushes religious movements to monopolise
the organisational field but religion also pro-
vides symbols of justice extending beyond
the individual’s rational cost-benefit calcu-
lus.23 In non-democratic environments, sym-
bolic protest – the veil, the kaffiyeh, the
colours of the flag, or vague slogans such as
“Islam is the solution” – dominates political
communication. The necessary resources
and networks to mobilise support – integral
to social movement success – are also found
in religion’s institutional legacy and its char-
itable activities. In most areas of the Middle
East, Islamist movements have been pro-
moted by the state in previous decades as a
counter to the left, a harvest whose fruit the
region is now reaping24 and currently,
Islamist charities substitute for the state’s
bankrupt social welfare institutions. 
The democratic process itself may well be
central to removing the impetus for violent
tactics in Islamist movements; however this
democracy must be considered fair, authen-
tic, and legitimate within the states in ques-
tion. The Arab world is rife with countries
whose elections display a democratic facade
while substantial violations pervade the
process, escaping international criticism.
Many countries use Islamism rhetoric to
deny civil liberties and basic human rights,
fuelling precisely the dynamic which drives
targeted organisations to use violent tactics
in their fight with the opposition. Any policy
encouraging democracy must be uniform,
neither barring participants from the demo-
cratic process or cancelling elections
Algerian-style. 
CONCLUSION
Islamism is one of the most important
geopolitical topics today, yet misconceptions
about it flourish. We lose a great deal by
ignoring the knowledge generated through
years of study in other parts of the world,
data that could aid in correctly identifying
what Islamism is, what causes it, when it
turns violent, and how best to meet our pol-
icy aims regarding it. Movement pragma-
tism provides an opportunity to craft target-
ed policies. Disregarding Islamist move-
ments to respond to democratic incentives is
tantamount to the tunnel vision that led to
the surprise at the fall of the Soviet Union
and the Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Some individuals and groups may be beyond
the pale, immune to the blandishments of
democratic politics, however even these hard
line groups originally grew out of local poli-
tics which could have been defused or mod-
erated at that level.
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